

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030040-3

NO. ()

1 OF 1

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

JPRS L/8337

15 March 1979

TRANSLATIONS ON SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
FOUO No. 625

AFRICA

U. S. JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF
MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION
OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET	1. Report No. JPRS L/8337	2.	3. Recipient's Accession No.																																																																				
4. Title and Subtitle TRANSLATIONS ON SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, FOUO No. 625		5. Report Date 15 March 1979																																																																					
7. Author(s)		6.																																																																					
9. Performing Organization Name and Address Joint Publications Research Service 1000 North Glebe Road Arlington, Virginia 22201		8. Performing Organization Rept. No.																																																																					
12. Sponsoring Organization Name and Address As above		10. Project/Task/Work Unit No.																																																																					
15. Supplementary Notes		11. Contract/Grant No.																																																																					
16. Abstracts The report contains information from African and specialized West European publications and radio on political, economic, and sociological developments.		13. Type of Report & Period Covered																																																																					
17. Key Words and Document Analysis. 17a. Descriptors		14.																																																																					
<table border="0"> <tr> <td>Political Science</td> <td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Inter-African Aff.</td> <td>Ghana</td> <td>Rwanda</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Sociology</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Angola</td> <td>Guinea</td> <td>Sao Tome and Principe</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Economics</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Benin</td> <td>Guinea-Bissau</td> <td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Senegal</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Culture (Social Sciences)</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Botswana</td> <td>Ivory Coast</td> <td>Seychelles</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Technological</td> <td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Cameroon</td> <td>Kenya</td> <td>Sierra Leone</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Cape Verde</td> <td>Lesotho</td> <td>Somalia</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Central African Empire</td> <td>Liberia</td> <td>South Africa</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Chad</td> <td>Madagascar</td> <td>Swaziland</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Comoro Islands</td> <td>Malawi</td> <td>Tanzania</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Congo</td> <td>Mali</td> <td>Togo</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Djibouti</td> <td>Mauritius</td> <td>Uganda</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Equatorial Guinea</td> <td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Mozambique</td> <td>Upper Volta</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Ethiopia</td> <td>Namibia</td> <td>Zaire</td> </tr> <tr> <td>17b. Identifiers/Open-Ended Terms</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Gabon</td> <td>Niger</td> <td>Zambia</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Gambia</td> <td>Nigeria</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> <td>Reunion</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> <td>Rhodesia</td> <td></td> </tr> </table>				Political Science	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Inter-African Aff.	Ghana	Rwanda	Sociology	<input type="checkbox"/> Angola	Guinea	Sao Tome and Principe	Economics	<input type="checkbox"/> Benin	Guinea-Bissau	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Senegal	Culture (Social Sciences)	<input type="checkbox"/> Botswana	Ivory Coast	Seychelles	Technological	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Cameroon	Kenya	Sierra Leone		<input type="checkbox"/> Cape Verde	Lesotho	Somalia		<input type="checkbox"/> Central African Empire	Liberia	South Africa		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Chad	Madagascar	Swaziland		<input type="checkbox"/> Comoro Islands	Malawi	Tanzania		<input type="checkbox"/> Congo	Mali	Togo		<input type="checkbox"/> Djibouti	Mauritius	Uganda		<input type="checkbox"/> Equatorial Guinea	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Mozambique	Upper Volta		<input type="checkbox"/> Ethiopia	Namibia	Zaire	17b. Identifiers/Open-Ended Terms	<input type="checkbox"/> Gabon	Niger	Zambia		<input type="checkbox"/> Gambia	Nigeria				Reunion				Rhodesia	
Political Science	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Inter-African Aff.	Ghana	Rwanda																																																																				
Sociology	<input type="checkbox"/> Angola	Guinea	Sao Tome and Principe																																																																				
Economics	<input type="checkbox"/> Benin	Guinea-Bissau	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Senegal																																																																				
Culture (Social Sciences)	<input type="checkbox"/> Botswana	Ivory Coast	Seychelles																																																																				
Technological	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Cameroon	Kenya	Sierra Leone																																																																				
	<input type="checkbox"/> Cape Verde	Lesotho	Somalia																																																																				
	<input type="checkbox"/> Central African Empire	Liberia	South Africa																																																																				
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Chad	Madagascar	Swaziland																																																																				
	<input type="checkbox"/> Comoro Islands	Malawi	Tanzania																																																																				
	<input type="checkbox"/> Congo	Mali	Togo																																																																				
	<input type="checkbox"/> Djibouti	Mauritius	Uganda																																																																				
	<input type="checkbox"/> Equatorial Guinea	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Mozambique	Upper Volta																																																																				
	<input type="checkbox"/> Ethiopia	Namibia	Zaire																																																																				
17b. Identifiers/Open-Ended Terms	<input type="checkbox"/> Gabon	Niger	Zambia																																																																				
	<input type="checkbox"/> Gambia	Nigeria																																																																					
		Reunion																																																																					
		Rhodesia																																																																					
17c. COSATI Field/Group 02,5D,5C,5K		19. Security Class (This Report) UNCLASSIFIED																																																																					
18. Availability Statement FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. Limited Number of Copies Available From JPRS		21. No. of Pages 39																																																																					
		20. Security Class (This Page) UNCLASSIFIED																																																																					
		22. Price																																																																					

FORM NTIS-35 (REV. 9-72)

THIS FORM MAY BE REPRODUCED

USCOMM-DC 4892-P72

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

JPRS L/8337

15 March 1979

TRANSLATIONS ON SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

FOUO No. 625

CONTENTS	PAGE
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS	
Ki-Zerbo Quits Politics To Run OCAM (Joseph Ki-Zerbo Interview; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 31 Jan 79).	1
Swedish Aid to Africa Reported (JEUNE AFRIQUE, 31 Jan 79).....	12
CAMEROON	
FRG Loans To Be Channeled Into Various Fields (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 5 Jan 79).....	13
French Loans for Aluminum, Telecommunications Sectors (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 29 Dec 78).....	15
Briefs	
Port 1978 Traffic Up	17
New Transport Airline	17
Electric Company 1978 Investments	17
Coffee Export Quotas Set	17
CHAD	
1979 Seen as Decisive Year After Fratricidal Struggle (JEUNE AFRIQUE, 17 Jan 79).....	19
Briefs	
Fan Captures Arada	21
MOZAMBIQUE	
Mozambique Reviewed: Economic, Political Choices Made (Christophe Batsch; LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, Jan 79).....	22

- a - [III - NE & A - 122 FOUO]

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CONTENTS (Continued)

Page

SENEGAL

Briefs

PDS Nonparticipation in Elections	35
EEC Chairman's Visit	35
Minister's Statement on Special Funds	35
Agricultural Grants	36
Rains Causing Storage Problems	36

-b-

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

KI-ZERBO QUILTS POLITICS TO RUN OCAM

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 31 Jan 79 pp 42-47

[Interview with Professor Joseph Ki-Zerbo, leader of the third party of Upper Volta, the UPV. Interview conducted by Siradou Diallo, with the participation of Sophie Bessis, Sory Serinde Diallo, Francoise Hubscher and Mustafa Zawy. Date and place of interview not given.]

[Text] He is big and he has a keen observing eye in a face that appears calm, but which lights up and becomes lively as the conversation turns to the topics that are important to him. Professor Joseph Ki-Zerbo is one of the best known men of a French-speaking African culture. His form, often clad in a wide indigo boubou, and his white cap are familiar in international conferences where African history is debated.

An agregé in history from the French University, this man of some fifty years of age taught in many teaching establishments and universities in Africa before returning to his native land, Upper Volta, where he did not hesitate to leap into the political arena while he continued to teach. He is currently the leader of the UPV (Upper Volta Progressive Union), the third party of Upper Volta. As a candidate in the presidential elections of May 1978, he was a worthy adversary for the president, General Sangoule Lamizana. Joseph Ki-Zerbo has just resigned his seat as deputy to the Upper Voltan National Assembly in order to devote himself to CAMES (African and Malagasy Council on Higher Education) which he founded. However, that is only an apparent departure from the political scene.

Let us rather listen to his explanations which demonstrate solid and faultless reasoning.

[Question] Do you consider yourself as an intellectual or as a politician?

[Answer] I do not think there is any contradiction between the two jobs. In any case, I consider myself to be an intellectual and a politician at the same time. That is all the more true since, when I was a student, I was already politically engaged. I wrote in the magazine of the African Catholic Students, TAM-TAM, as well as in the FEANF [Federation of Black African

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Students in France] organ, which was L'ETUDIANT D'AFRIQUE NOIRE. Certain of my articles, such as: "Nationalists Called For" and "Pioneers or Mandarins" particularly irritated the colonial power of that time.

[Question] You have evolved since then....

[Answer] To my way of thinking, the concept of being an intellectual is not something either static or reserved. That is why the people, according to me, are a collective intellectual, while I consider myself as an organic intellectual in the sense that the Italian philosopher Antonio Gramsci understood it. In other words, that is an individual who has decided to invest himself in the masses, to participate in their daily struggles for life, to help them and to learn from them. Having said that, I concede to you that there is at the same time a certain tension between the concerns of a politician and the sentiments of an intellectual. The calculations of the former do not always coincide with the scruples of the latter. However, it is possible to overcome that contradiction thanks to a total engagement in the combat of the popular masses. And that's what I do.

[Question] Is it easier or harder to be an intellectual than it was 20 years ago?

[Answer] It was infinitely easier during the colonial period. The intellectuals, at least those who wanted to be intellectuals, had a privileged place on the condition of being indifferent to the state of the people and chiefly not causing any trouble for the system. Today, not only is that privileged position less easy to come by, but it is still more difficult to remain indifferent when faced by the situation. Without counting the fact that there are even more risks in opposing power today than there were 20 years ago.

[Question] Has the intellectual African more responsibilities than those of the developed countries, or fewer?

[Answer] It is obvious that the African intellectual has more responsibilities than the others. In the European countries, the social structure is more complex, more structured. Each organized element is sufficiently armed for the defense of its own interests, not to say its "territory." And then there are lots of intellectuals. All that results in their responsibilities being better shared. Therefore they are smaller for each one of the intellectuals taken in isolation. In Africa, it's completely the opposite.

[Question] You were observing that the African intellectual should invest himself, help the peasants. How, and in what way? Saying it another way, what can an intellectual do among the peasants?

[Answer] He can help them to survive in their own place. The peasants often constitute an atomized body, fragmented and scattered as compared to the other social classes or strata. They are therefore weaker, easier to exploit by those who have the resources, even by the multinationals. You know how certain

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

unscrupulous businessmen exploit the peasants by buying their grain at a very low price at the time of the harvest in order to sell it back to them at a very high price during the hot weather. The intellectuals can help the peasants organize, structure themselves for the purpose of better resisting that type of exploitation, for better understanding the objective role that they play in society.

[Question] Don't those formulae come from never-applied good intentions or even from a form of demagogery?

[Answer] Absolutely not. The engaged intellectuals can and should, as true militants, help the peasants to struggle successfully against their exploiters. They can even help them in a very simple way even though that might only be by teaching them how to organize their primary needs, by teaching them to read and write.

[Question] Are the African intellectuals of today fully assuming their responsibilities?

[Answer] No, unfortunately. However, I would not want to throw a stone at anyone especially since I recognize that there are individual cases. However, as a whole, I observe with a great deal of regret that African intellectuals are running away from their historical responsibilities in order to take their places in the existing system. Most of them are satisfied with the status quo. Even though some maintain that they do not engage in politics they are not to be excused since for that very reason they contribute to the consolidation of the dominating system. The sad truth is that the intellectuals are traveling along the road to power and to getting rich, and they are condemning themselves to sterility. Those who fully assume their historical responsibilities are rare.

[Question] Some intellectuals are still faithful to revolutionary ideas and are actively militating in favor of a radical change in the structures of our societies.

[Answer] Yes, there are some like that. And that is very comforting. However, among those who call themselves revolutionaries there are some who wrap themselves up in cloudy, purely abstract theories in order to fly without ever landing. While they claim to be prophets incarnate, they are really playing a harmful and dangerous role. Fortunately there are some of them who are willing to play an organic role, who fight to lay the foundations of qualitative change, based on the socio-economic realities of our countries.

[Question] You recently resigned your seat as deputy in order to devote yourself to the African and Malagasy Council on Higher Education [CAMES], according to your own statement. Does this mean that you are abandoning political action for the sake of a purely technical job?

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Answer] No, not at all. I am not only not abandoning my political activities, but I am still the leader of my party, the Upper Volta Progressive Union [UPV]. If I have taken up the leadership of CAMES again, it is in order to keep it from falling into jeopardy. I became afraid that the activity that I had undertaken at the head of CAMES might be seriously compromised because, in the current state of affairs, certain people rightly or wrongly are confident in that organization most of all because of the faith that they have in me. In my absence, those people had a tendency to lose interest. Now CAMES is something very important, not to say vital.

[Question] In your opinion, is the position of Secretary-General of CAMES more important than the position of deputy to the National Assembly of Upper Volta?

[Answer] The problem is not to be expressed in those terms. As you know, there are some feelers going out for achieving African unity by political action, by economic action, by regional cooperation through customs regulations, flow of goods, etc.

CAMES is trying to contribute to African unity by means of higher education and research. Thus we are working with a view toward harmonizing university diplomas on the level of our different countries; we have set up an important program for research in the domain of the African pharmacopeia; we have created an inter-African consultative committee whose role consists in controlling the internal promotion of the universities, and that within an inter-African framework. This is to tell you of the strategic importance of CAMES for the education of generations to come and for African unity. For that reason, I certainly would not be neglecting my political responsibilities in the Upper Volta.

[Question] That does not rule out the fact that by giving up your seat as deputy you are denying yourself the prerogatives that belong to that position in your country.

[Answer] Not at all. First, the UPV is not an electoral party. And furthermore, the Political Bureau of the UPV has judged that I am right now more useful to my party outside the Upper Voltan National Assembly than inside it. And that is true both for the formative or structuring activity and for the extension of the party. For the rest, the contemporary history of Upper Volta is more often being made outside the National Assembly than within it. In any event, for us, the Assembly is not a goal in itself.

[Question] The pay of an Upper Voltan deputy is without a doubt lower than that of a Secretary General of CAMES.

[Answer] I know that some of my adversaries have expressed that kind of comparison for the purpose of insinuating all kinds of things. However, if I wanted to be better paid I would not work in Africa. I do not have great needs and I do not run after money, which I value most of all for what it can

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

be used for. I can even open my books to anyone who wants to see them. Furthermore, CAMES is a small organization which does not have a large budget. It has very small resources compared to the resources of other international organizations where I could have occupied key positions if I had wanted to.

[Question] Don't you feel that you may have deceived those who voted for you and those who supported you by abandoning the position that they confided to you?

[Answer] I have indeed sidetracked them, but they have not been deceived in the strict sense of the term. As for the latter points, before submitting my resignation I went to the base, which means to my voters, to inform them about my plans and to discuss them with them. I must confess that at the beginning certain people were affected to the point of being shocked. However, after my explanations, no one was slow to understand the political significance of my act. Furthermore, in the UPV we do not want our elected members to be politicians with a monopolistic ownership of seats. They must be first of all in the service of the party and of its objectives.

[Question] At the time of the last legislative and presidential elections in Upper Volta I was struck both by the liberty of expression and by the violence of the opposition attacks against President Lamizana.

[Answer] Personally, I have not made violent attacks against Lamizana. At any rate, I have not made personal attacks. I have always kept a moderate attitude in regard to him. As for the liberty of expression, it is true that it is complete in Upper Volta except for a few recent seizures of newspapers. Among us there is neither police repression nor arbitrary arrest and even less is there torture. In the African context of today, we must recognize that there is something very important if not almost miraculous.... Not entirely, since it is the result of a patient and courageous fight by the people and by their avant-garde elements.

[Question] That doesn't keep you from fighting the regime of General Lamizana. What do you have against him?

[Answer] Our central option is radically opposed to the policy now being followed by Lamizana's government. The way in which he is managing the country is dangerous in the long run. His laissez-faire policy makes us risk a painful morning after. Chiefly on the economic level, because we are observing a constant deterioration of the peasantry's living conditions and living standards and those of the proletariat or the urban unemployed. Along with Lamizana's lack of authority his power is continually giving way to the strongest pressures, even though these might be from sharks. The regime has no political choices, no options and not the slightest line. In this way the state is a ship which is drifting at the mercy of the current. It's very fine to swim in the waters of democracy, but this Pontius Pilate policy runs the risk in the long run of leading to impasses and explosive contradictions.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Question] However, it is thanks to Lamizana that the opposition in Upper Volta can organize themselves as they may. Publish what they want and hold public meetings. In short, they can propose and criticize with complete liberty. In any event, without fear of being arrested or even summoned by the police....

[Answer] That situation, which other people envy us for, was not the doing of Lamizana. The credit for it comes back to the entire people of Volta. It is the people who are at the same time responsible for and the guarantors for that liberty which Upper Volta enjoys. We must not forget that we have profited in the past from a concatenation of particular circumstances. Contrary to what has happened in other African countries, no party or group has been so much more powerful than the others that it was able to smash them. The atmosphere of liberty that Upper Volta enjoys is the result of those facts and not the results of Lamizana's goodwill.

[Question] That analysis is without a doubt very accurate from the theoretical point of view. But aren't you afraid that in the effort to oppose Lamizana some pretorian of another temperament than his may appear to put an end to your democratic experiment?

[Answer] That is not impossible. But it's up to us to prevent it from occurring. And for that reason there is only one thing to do: consolidate the existing democratic systems by reinforcing the political parties and the unions, as well as all the democratic and popular organizations.

[Question] Are you satisfied by the way in which the democratic experiment is developing in Upper Volta?

[Answer] We are relatively satisfied because we are convinced supporters of the democratic game. However, in order for the game to develop under good conditions, it is important that the dice not be loaded. Now in that respect we have a few motives for worry, since some of the dispositions anticipated in the Constitution adopted by referendum are not being respected either in the spirit or in the letter. Thus, the Constitution expressly recognizes three political parties. Those are the three which came out on top in the elections. Now since those elections that isn't spoken of any more.... What is worse, a party which is not one of the three official ones has four ministers in the present government. Some people are no longer hesitating about speaking of a constitutional reform....

What is sure is that the democracy which was to spread out from the bottom, since it was anticipated that the municipalities would be democratically elected, well! -- that democracy has been undermined ever since the power has seen its interests threatened. Special delegations are going to be set up. And the elections at the base are to be put off until the next blue moon. All of that makes us ask ourselves whether the spirit of the Constitution is being betrayed. That is serious and it is even very dangerous.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Question] Does this mean that Upper Voltan democracy is purely formal?

[Answer] Not entirely. However, we are afraid of sliding in that direction. That is why we maintain our vigilance, because the experiment is at the mercy of the slightest accident along the way.

[Question] Why do you refuse to form a government of national union to include all the parties?

[Answer] We have not refused! On the contrary, we believe that it would be a good thing, on condition that an understanding be reached on a minimum platform, since it is not a question for us of a pure and simple rallying to the present government. An understanding is not impossible, but it must come out of an agreement on a clearly defined program which could be applied within a specified length of time. For the rest, the present government majority is based on a misunderstanding. In fact, it is crystalized around a purely hypothetical situation instead of adopting a precise program. That is to say it is rather precarious.

[Question] The non-rehabilitation of Maurice Yameogo and his companions continues to poison the political atmosphere of Upper Volta.

[Answer] On that score we have not changed. We have always been and we still are in favor of the rehabilitation of ex-President Maurice Yameogo and his five companions. Because we believe that it is not normal that those personalities be indefinitely considered as scabby sheep. Maurice was not alone responsible for the errors committed by the former regime. There are some people who occupied important positions at that time and who, still today, occupy high places.... We believe that the time has come to turn the page. Not in order to start the same errors over again as before or to reedit the past, but to act in a completely different sense.

[Question] What keeps your party, the UPV, from constituting a bloc even if it were only on the level of the National Assembly, with the National Union for Defense of Democracy (the UNDD) of Mr Maurice Yameogo and the Refusal Front of Mr Joseph Ouedraogo?

[Answer] We got that point in a negative way during the last electoral campaign. I mean that everybody was against the common electoral opponent. After which, upon the opening of the National Assembly, we presented together the candidacy of Joseph Ouedraogo for the Presidency of the Chamber. However, it would be difficult to go farther than that in the sense of an understanding among us. First, because the Refusal Front, which has a real base, is not properly speaking a political party. And then, chiefly, we need to better observe the programs of the two other groups in order to eventually envisage a common platform.

[Question] If you were called to power following a military coup d'etat, what would you do?

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Answer] You know that in countries like ours the military could not constitute a separate social body. That having been said, such a military coup, which nothing today permits us to envisage, should not be the business of one single man. It would be necessary for there to be a group in effective control over the Army, having a frankly progressive commitment and political option. It's only under those conditions, it seems to me, that such an experiment would have any chance of succeeding. In any other way it would be risking a coup for nothing.

[Question] Do those conditions seem to you to be currently present in the Upper Volta Army?

[Answer] It is difficult to know that, especially since the military men have claimed for a long time that they do not engage in politics, which is totally false. That myth does not stand up under analysis. How can it be said that the people who govern a country are not engaged in politics? That is an aberration. The proof? Lamizana, who has adapted himself to various pressures, haphazardly puts certain of his companions out to pasture.

[Question] Do you think that the democratic experiment in Upper Volta is capable of being transferred to other parts of Africa?

[Answer] Not entirely, since, I repeat, we have profited in Upper Volta from a concatenation of particular circumstances. And then our people, who are a little set in their ways and difficult to persuade, have nevertheless some real qualities. The people are relatively pure and they are very well disciplined. And they are in addition to that completely capable of endurance and of ideals. Combined with the feeling of engagement of an intelligentsia which is relatively united on essential points, those qualities have permitted Upper Volta to profit from an experiment which is unique in Africa. This is a democratic experiment which is even more 'interesting because it has found to its amazement soldiers who are not carried away to excesses, not carried away to brutality or to the repressions which characterize their opposite numbers in other places. Frankly, I believe that those are trump cards which can't be exported.

[Question] Does that mean that Africa is not completely ready for democracy?

[Answer] Let us say rather that democracy is not ready for Africa. Because what is democracy for countries where the majority of the people are illiterate? Is it an artificial multi-party system or a real liberty of expression? If it is a question of the latter I will ask you to observe that that type of democracy existed in Africa even before colonization. Our pre-colonial societies were very democratic in the sense in which, based on the grass-roots communities founded on self-management, people enjoyed a complete liberty of expression.

[Question] But we are not speaking of the past however fine it may have been. It is a question of the Africa of today.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Answer] If I speak of the past it is not because I would like us to return to it. There is no question of that. However, the past must be kept in mind, all the more so because there are still many people in Africa who are living under the rule of the past, who do not know anything but the ancestral regime.

[Question] Would multi-party rule be a handicap for national unity and for the economic progress of Africa?

[Answer] It is true that a multi-party system cannot exist without presenting problems, since that kind of system can easily degenerate into anarchy and then into dictatorship. Chiefly if the political leaders are not aware of their responsibilities. Polarization and personalization of the parties imply serious risks of division. However, I am still convinced for my part that the risks that I have just mentioned are still not as great as those of a single party. Unless it's a single party that has come out of a war or out of a collective struggle for liberation, in which case the risks of division among the people are reduced. Only, even in that case, it is important to create some safeguards for the sake of preventing the temptation of a personal dictatorship.

[Question] Only the countries coming out of a struggle for liberation are to be excused when they chose single parties?

[Answer] Yes, because in that case the party is rather a party unified by the struggle. Elsewhere, I do not believe a single party is acceptable. Let's take Nkrumah's Ghana. There the single party was justified because Nkrumah's party really was the struggle incarnate for the liberation of all Africa. Only, the Ghanaian leader had underestimated the resistance capacity of the bourgeoisie. He would have had to neutralize it eventually. He did not do so. That's what defeated him. In other words, the creation of a single party can be carried out at a price compatible with democracy only when the classes are not yet well installed and structured. Now we must come to an understanding on the definition of the word democracy.

[Question] In your opinion, which are the African regimes which have succeeded and which you would give as models to your militants, if not to the rest of Africa?

[Answer] We have not yet enough perspective to seriously appreciate the experiments which are going on in Africa. Nevertheless, it seems to me that certain ones have succeeded less badly than others. At the same time that I am an advocate of socialism, I am against the bureaucratic socialism which, in Africa, can engender new privileged classes just as well as classical capitalism. If I may be permitted to dream, I shall dream of a socialism which is prepared to give a greater place to grass-roots collective enterprises. That's why I think that, in the current state of the experiments under way in Africa, Tanzania and Guinea-Bissau seems to me completely worthy of interest.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Question] Would you be a shameful reactionary or a communist who did not dare tell his name?

[Answer] I am perhaps somewhere between those two, if not above them, at least there is a little bit of each of them in me. One never knows! However, if we must be serious, I will tell you that I am not a communist in the sense that I do not accept atheism, since I am a believer. However, I accept a certain number of things in Marxism. Thus, I readily admit dialectics as a tool for analysis and a method of seizing reality. At the same time, I totally adhere to the theory of class struggle since, as a historian, I observe that the class struggle, just like the violence which is also taking place, is a reality. The entire question is to know in whose service the class struggle and the violence are being used. I am not in favor of the cult of violence.

[Question] As you are a historian, are you surprised by the speed with which the Chinese are destroying the myth of Mao?

[Answer] I am not at all surprised by the de-Maoization. However, I admit that the speed with which it is going on does surprise me. I believe that given the historical role of Mao it was necessary, once that Mao died, that the role be conferred on another person in order to permit the continuation of the forward march of the Chinese people. Having said that, I think that the present attitude of the Chinese can be explained to a great measure by the fears and the worries that their great neighbour, the Soviet Union, inspires in them. We must not forget either the specific difficulties inherent in the Chinese world: the vast area, the great demographic concentrations....

[Question] Do you think that the French are racists?

[Answer] It is obvious that racism has developed a great deal in France during recent years. I remember that when I arrived in France to continue my studies, which was at the beginning of the 50s, people looked at Africans with a curiosity mixed with friendship. But there was generally no racist sentiment among the French. The most one observed was sometimes paternalism. Only there weren't a great many of us in France. Now, later, the number of Africans has increased a great deal, to the point where the habitual threshold of tolerance in the case of racial cohabitation has since been overstepped. At present certain French people believe that all the foreigners that they meet on the street have come to take their jobs away from them. But people forget that the problem of immigrants is a by-product of the contradictions of capitalism.

[Question] Have you personally been a victim of racism in France?

[Answer] Yes, two anecdotes. The first time, a lady called me on Rivoli Street to tell me: "I do not like Blacks, they are dirty and dishonest."

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The second time it was in pastry shop where, after an argument that she had provoked, a lady from whom I wished to buy a cake threw at me: "Dirty race!"

[Question] Do you think that African unity has advanced or retreated since the coming of independence?

[Answer] It must be recognized that in many ways that notion has rather retreated. At the beginning of the 60s a common ideal was shared. We had a project, without any doubt a badly defined project, but we had in spite of that a common project whose strongest moment was when the OAU was founded at Addis Ababa in 1963. Only later foreign influences were stronger than the projected unity. Fortunately, the experiences that had been lived through constitute a precious capital for the future. Everything that is necessary is that all people accept the necessity of a certain mutual toleration. That is indispensable if we wish to make progress, to go forward with a feeling of unity.

[Question] Are you optimistic in that regard?

[Answer] I am a realist if I am not optimistic. I am convinced that we will find our way. No doubt there will be some backsliding here and there. However, overall, some promising forces and impulses are being released. The coming generations, who have not been tied to the colonial system, are rather more tractable in this regard. The leaders of our countries should show greater solicitude in regard to that youth and thus fully assume their responsibilities. The African intellectuals themselves, whether they be in power or not, whether they live in Africa or abroad, should participate in the "impulsing bloc" so dear to Gramsci. It is only by joining their efforts to those of the peasantry and those of the other exploited social strata that they will be able to play the role of a real locomotive of progress, which history gives to them and which the African masses expect from them.

COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979

12,116
CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

SWEDISH AID TO AFRICA REPORTED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 31 Jan 79 p 36

[Article by S.S.D]

[Text] Swedish aid to Africa is being maintained at a high level. Some 1.02 billion crowns (51.35 billion CFA [African Financial Community] francs and some 23.5 percent of all aid to the Third World) are included under this heading in the budget for the 1979-80 fiscal year, which begins next 1 July.

The "frontline" will receive 36 billion CFA francs, or more than 70 percent of the total. Heading the list, with 17.2 billion CFA francs, is Tanzania, followed by Mozambique (7 billion), Zambia (5.2 billion), Angola (3.5 billion) and Botswana (3 billion). The other countries to receive aid belong to the progressive camp (Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Ethiopia, Somalia) with the exception of Tunisia, Kenya and Lesotho. French-speaking Africa (with the exception of Tunisia) does not receive any aid from Stockholm at this time.

An equally important effort has been agreed to in favor of the liberation movements in southern Africa as well as for the refugees from that region and for the victims of apartheid. They will be granted 6 billion CFA francs (or 41 percent more in relation to the 1978-79 fiscal year).

It is observed however that Swedish aid to Africa is showing a somewhat smaller growth (10.2 percent as compared to 13 percent) than the total aid to the Third World (which is equally concentrated, as only 20 states will profit from it). Swedish aid is kept at the level of 1 percent of Sweden's GNP as in Norway and in the Netherlands, and the greater part is granted in the form of gifts. Furthermore, the part of the aid tied to the obligation of the receiving countries buying equipment and merchandise in Sweden will diminish: 32.5 billion CFA francs as opposed to 33.7 billion during the fiscal year which is coming to an end. This, according to foreign minister Hans Blix, is "the Swedish contribution to the international debate on this kind of aid."

COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CAMEROON

FRG LOANS TO BE CHANNELED INTO VARIOUS FIELDS

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 5 Jan 79 p 33

[Article: "Germano-Cameroon Cooperation 1978-1979; 115 Million Marks for a Dozen Projects"]

[Excerpt] At the end of negotiations which took place at Yaounde from 30 October to 4 November 1978, the Federal Republic of Germany placed at Cameroon's disposal for the period 1978-1979 the following credits:

--DM 85 million as financial cooperation (repayment period: 50 years, 10 years deferred, at 0.75 percent interest);

--more than DM 27.4 million as technical cooperation;

--DM 3.5 million as technological cooperation.

Financial Cooperation

The grant of DM 85 million will be allotted as follows:

- 1) DM 8 million for a project of water canalization involving 8 centers.
- 2) In addition to DM 20 million already allotted, the FRG is granting another loan of DM 5 million for enlargement of the port of Douala. This new loan will be used for the creation of a complementary container wharf with a roll on-roll off installation.
- 3) DM 14 million are planned for the second phase of the "meat plan" to consolidate measures undertaken during the first phase: eradication of the tsetse fly and promotion of meat production (the FRG had already participated in this first phase).
- 4) DM 14 million will go to the integrated development project of the Northwest region--chiefly for financing road construction. Moreover, DM 5 million reserved during 1976 negotiations for FONADER [National Rural Development Fund] will be reprogrammed for financing means of agricultural production in the region.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

5) DM 3 million will be marked for a study fund instituted in order to facilitate the preparation of projects within the framework of bilateral cooperation or private cooperation.

6) DM 41 million will be consecrated to financing the Yaounde-Bafoussam road and more specifically for the Bafoussam-Bafia section, the portion reputed to be the most critical and nevertheless indispensable to insure the profitability of the road in its entirety. Cameroon is moreover presently engaged in other negotiations with a view to insuring total financing of the project.

COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1979

9330
CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CAMEROON

FRENCH LOANS FOR ALUMINUM, TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTORS

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 29 Dec 78 p 3566

[Text] The (French) Central Fund for Economic Development granted Cameroon, 19 December, 7 loans totaling 244 million French francs (12.2 billion CFA francs), distributed as follows:

--Two over-the-counter loans, one of 50 million French francs (2.5 billion CFA francs), the other of 80 million French francs (4 billion CFA francs) to the Cameroon Aluminum Co (ALUCAM), a subsidiary of Pechiney-Ugine-Kuhlmann, will make it possible to increase annual production capacity at the Edea plant from 45,000 to 80,000 tons of aluminum and will provide for future extension to 165,000 tons.

--This industrial operation was made possible by construction of the new hydro-electric dam of Song-Loulou, in the financing of which the Central Fund took a large part last year. A new loan of 20 million francs (1 billion CFA francs) to the United Cameroon Republic will make it possible to install a 4th hydro-electric complex and construct a second high tension wire towards Edea.

--Two over-the-counter loans, one of 35 million francs (1.75 billion CFA francs), the other of 37 million francs (1.85 billion CFA francs) will be granted Cameroon to facilitate a new development of internal telecommunications. The planned program concerns both technical installations and the training or recycling of Cameroon maintenance personnel.

--A loan of 14.5 million francs (725 million CFA francs) will be granted the Cameroon Development Bank on behalf of Cameroon Textile (SOLICAM), a subsidiary of the French group Texunion. SOLICAM is building a factory which will manufacture, using cotton grown and spun in Cameroon, 850 tons a year of Turkish toweling targeted for the local market. The investment cost is valued at 54 million francs (2.7 billion CFA francs). The European Investment Bank will participate in the financing along with the Central Fund.

--A loan of 7.5 million francs (375 million CFA francs) to the Cameroon Development Bank will complete the 6 million francs (300 million CFA francs)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

which the Central Fund already granted in 1975 for the same object: financial aid to small and medium-sized Cameroon enterprises. This assistance itself constitutes one of the aspects of a program aimed at creating small and medium-sized local enterprises and supporting them both technically and financially. It has been assumed, for the main part, by the World Bank, the UN Development Program and the Central Fund.

COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1978

9330
CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CAMEROON

BRIEFS

PORT 1978 TRAFFIC UP--The administrative council of the Cameroon National Ports Office met at the end of December with the Minister of Transportation, John Nkengong Monie presiding. The council examined the activity report of fiscal 1977-1978 and the certification of accounts and balance-sheet through 30 June 1978 inclusive. The result is that activity was characterized by a general increase in traffic, and by good progress, in spite of several difficulties, on enlargement of the Port of Douala. Fiscal 1977-1978 shows a net profit of 1.2 billion CFA francs. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 12 Jan 79 p 88] 9330

NEW TRANSPORT AIRLINE--The recent creation of the company Air Affaires Afrique [Air Africa Business Line], with a capital of 70 million Fr CFAs, specializing in on-call transportation in Cameroon and Central Africa, has been announced. This company's workshop will ensure maintenance and inspection of planes and equipment, especially radio-communication and navigational equipment, and will act as representatives of civil and military aeronautical hardware. The principal base of Air Affaires Afrique is in the light aviation zone of the Douala International Airport. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Jan 79 p 143] 9330

ELECTRIC COMPANY 1978 INVESTMENTS--Mr Nyatt, director of SONEI [National Electric Company in Cameroon] struck the balance of the national company investments in a year-end meeting. From 1974 to 1977, investments rose from 24 to 43 billion CFA francs. By 1984, on the whole, they will rise to more than 110 billion, to serve customers which, by that time, will have increased by 77 percent from 1974 to 1978, and by 95 percent from 1979 to 1984. During this period, the turnover will have risen from 7.5 billion in 1974 to 13.5 billion in 1978 and will top 35 billion in 1984. Lastly, employees numbering 1,500 in 1974 and 2,100 presently will increase to 2,500 in 1984. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Jan 79 p 143] 9330

COFFEE EXPORT QUOTAS SET--The minister of economy and planning has just signed an order enforcing the presidential decree on the consent agreement with the National Office of Marketing of Staple Commodities of exporters of Robusta coffee for the 1978-1979 season. Each exporter is thus assigned a purchase

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

quota. The purchases of each exporter can neither exceed nor fall below the quota they have been allotted. For purchases exceeding the allotted quota by 15 percent, a penalty of 8 CFA francs per kilo will be levied on the exporter. When the exporter's purchases do not reach 85 percent of the allotted quota, a penalty of 8 francs per kg for the quantity corresponding to the percentage of purchases not made will also be levied. Any direct or indirect quota transfer among exporters is prohibited. The exporters are bound to maintain the level of activity during the entire duration of the fiscal year. An exporter who has not filled at least 60 percent of his individual quota will sustain an immediate reduction which may extend to 25 percent of the quota. The percentage thus withheld will be assigned by the minister of economy and planning to another exporter. The purchase price of Robusta coffee guaranteed producers in the authorized collection centers as provided for in the decree of 3 January 1979 is uniformly fixed at 280 CFA francs the kilo. This price must in fact be paid the planter with no reduction. [Excerpt] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Jan 79 p 144] 9330

CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CHAD

1979 SEEN AS DECISIVE YEAR AFTER FRATRICIDAL STRUGGLE

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 17 Jan 79 p 37

[Article by A.D.: "The Great Showdown"]

[Text] The great showdown appears to be imminent. The "sponsors" in Paris and Tripoli could be in for a surprise.

Three unusual events have marked the start of the new year in Chad:

Premier Hissene Habre, emulated by most of his ministers, boycotted the official ceremonies of the presentation of good wishes to President Felix Malloum. The latter, in order not to worsen the dispute with his impetuous premier, was compelled to cancel a ministerial meeting.

Goukouni Oueddei, president of FROLINAT, and Adam Togoï, his chief of staff, who with the men they lead control over 60 percent of the part of Chad that is under rebellion, have found themselves to be in trouble with the Libyan leaders, until recently their "patrons." They are said to be prisoners in the Sebha region south of Libya. No one answers the telephone any more in the FROLINAT headquarters in Tripoli.

After a lull of several months, a resumption of the fighting is to be noted very far from the "dividing" line between rebels and government troops. The increased insecurity has once more affected Ndjamena, with the explosion of a homemade bomb in a movie theatre. The resumption of hostilities is not the doing of Goukouni's men, but rather of other rebel groups who want to be in on things when the great showdown that appears imminent takes place.

The year 1979 could be a decisive year, after a fratricidal war lasting over 12 years. Something is accelerating in this immense, poor, landlocked country that lies astride Moslem white Africa and Catholic or animist black Africa. For a long time, a minority from the South has controlled and governed the country at will, causing serious frustrations in the North. The Chadian problem has solidified for more than 10 years both as a result of the lack of understanding on the part of the governments in Fort Lamy—which has been

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

renamed Ndjamená—and due to the dissensions between FROLINAT leaders. It was a fine terrain for foreign interventions and interference, and 1978 saw Libyan surface-to-air missiles being employed in an effort to down French Jaguar aircraft.

In this chess game, Tripoli, sponsor of the rebellious part of Chad, playing on the white squares, and Paris, sponsor of official Chad, playing on the black squares, have seen things alternate for them between hot and cold, and between moments of satisfaction and concern. A large FROLINAT offensive last spring almost brought Ndjamená to its knees. These difficulties had the effect of arousing the administration out of a certain amount of torpor. That accounts for the invitation to Hisséine Habré, the ex-rebel and ex-jailer of M^{me} Claustre, to form a more politically and ethnically-balanced government on 29 August 1978.

That success did not fail to make those still fighting take stock, all the more so because appeals issued by Ndjamená for a national reconciliation without victor or vanquished reaffirmed the principles "of the secularity, oneness, and indivisibility of the Chadian government." These principles, with some slight variations, are those of the fighting opposition.

After having won over Hisséine Habré, Félix Malloum tried to do the same with Goukouni. That made some persons unhappy: Habré, the former companion of Goukouni in the guerrilla forces in northern Chad, who has been afraid of seeing his influence diminish, and... the Libyans.

The latter are at their wits end. For a long time they bet on Abba Sidick and then Hisséine Habré, before falling back on Goukouni, "their" liberator of M^{me} Claustre. Tripoli thought it had finally found the man it would install at Ndjamená and thereby have a definitive solution to the problem of the Aouzou strip, that part of northern Chad occupied by Libya. But it turns out that Tripoli has once more banked on a Chadian who is just as devoted to the integrity of his country as Hisséine Habré or others. A virtual underground psychological warfare has led to this setback, just when Ndjamená seemed within their grasp. Everything has to be done over again. A new chess game is beginning again in 1979, with two "chessmasters" installed in Paris and Tripoli. But on this vast chessboard, the squares might no longer be respected. Both sides are threatening to boycott the game and seem to be inclined to resume it on their own behalf, between Chadians.

COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979

5346
CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CHAD

BRIEFS

FAN CAPTURES ARADA--The town of Arada, 100 kms north of Abeche, in eastern Chad, occupied by the FROLINAT-Volcan, was attacked and captured on 7 January by the forces of the CCFAN (former Command Council of the Armed Forces of the North) which was directed by Hissene Habre, the present Chadian prime minister. According to reports from Ndjamen, the fighting, the balance of which is not yet known, was particularly heavy. The Chad radio has stated that the Arada confrontation "follows several acts of provocation perpetrated by the FROLINAT, including the systematic mining of communications routes used by the FAN and which led to losses in lives and material damage, the latest of which provocations took place on 6 January." "In view of the gravity of the situation," the radio continued, "and taking into account such repeated provocations, this legitimate defense position has become inevitable." [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 12 Jan 79 p 90] 8339

CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MOZAMBIQUE

MOZAMBIQUE REVIEWED: ECONOMIC, POLITICAL CHOICES MADE

Paris LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE in French Jan 79 pp 6-8

[Article by Christophe Batsch: "Mozambique's Choice"]

[Excerpts] "Independence happened three years too soon!" The saying, repeated 1,000 times, aims at having the foreign visitor understand the whole road that has been run since 25 June 1975 and the magnitude of the difficulties still being encountered today. It also shows to what extent practices acquired during the armed struggle are still the source of inspiration and reference and the model for an independent Mozambique.

Whether a spinning mill is running at a quarter of its production capacity for lack of isolated parts, or a fisherman's cooperative fails to receive its boats, or a "people's store" stops being supplied with flour, or they are addressing an undisciplined pupil or a group of peasant victims of Zambeze floods, the leaders tirelessly repeat the same speech: the present difficulties are numerous, but during the armed struggle our means were still very weak. The implied conclusion: we were able to conquer then, we will conquer again "by counting on our own forces."

On 25 June 1975, after 12 years of armed struggle and 10 months of "transition government", Mozambique acceded to independence under the aegis of the FRELIMO (Mozambique Liberation Front), without foreign military intervention.

The Preeminence of the Party

A major political event of recent months took place when the FRELIMO, the national liberation movement, was transformed into a Marxist-Leninist party. The decision, made on the occasion of the Third Congress, meeting in Maputo in February 1977, provided the kickoff for a recruitment campaign called "structuralizing the Party" which came to an end on 11 November 1978.


Resolute followers of "scientific socialism", determined to be at the head of the first authentically Marxist-Leninist party in power in Africa, the Mozambican leaders miss no opportunity to recall that "the universality of Marxism-Leninism is affirmed in the specificity of every national process."¹ The Party's cells were created after a severe filtering of candidacies that has less

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

to do with theoretical knowledge than with "a sense of responsibility, love of his profession, sound moral conduct" and rules out those who "do not live exclusively for their work or who have in the past participated in counter-revolutionary activities.

As the country's liberator FRELIMO enjoyed an immense popularity. As an armed movement with not very many members, implanted in only a few regions, its problem after independence was to transform that popularity into an authority to be recognized by all. As heir to the colonial state apparatus, it undertook to take it in hand and transform it, running into suspicion on the part of the civil servants but nevertheless forced by the lack of staff people to make use of all available skills. Within each administration the FRELIMO promoted "energizing groups", composed of verified militants and charged with seeing to it that its directives were enforced. In a first phase (1975-1977) these organizations included only minor administration elements, as FRELIMO mistrusted the high level leaders, including those it had been able to install. Today Party cells have everywhere replaced the "energizing groups" and the FRELIMO demands that state cadres be members of the Party.

STATE AND PARTY STRUCTURES



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Its whole effort, in fact, is aimed at making "the people's state the principal instrument for bringing Party policy into being...The Party utilizes the state as an instrument for realizing its policy²". These principles are often illustrated, especially at the summit, by confusion as to which tasks are the Party's and which the state's. Samora Machel is president of one and chairman of the other; his four chief ministers, Dos Santos, Rebelo, Chissano and Monteiro are simultaneously secretaries of the Central Committee for the field that coincides with their ministerial activities³.

Elections giving rise to the people's assemblies took place during the last quarter of 1977, following modalities rather resembling those of People's China in its early days. Supervised by the secretariat in the Party organization, they lead--in every neighborhood and every locality--to a long campaign of political agitation and a campaign for selection of candidates. Each assembly appoints its own executive committee which assumes basic powers; as a matter of fact, the assemblies do not sit regularly and the sessions are short. The National Assembly meets occasionally to ratify the Party's important decisions: revision of the constitution, approval of international treaties, etc. Its permanent committee, with 20 members, assures the continuity of the legislative work. In a people for whom the long colonial presence, illiteracy and the diversity of languages were so many obstacles to political debate, the electoral year has represented a remarkable apprenticeship in democracy, as testified to by the vigor and passion of the speeches about candidacies.

Revolutionary Vigilance and Morality

In the course of this national debate the question of repression has emerged massively and repeatedly. As after any great upheaval that brings about a change in managing personnel--one remembers the purge in France immediately after the liberation--the problem has quickly taken a political direction. Punishing past injustices guarantees change, legitimizing the new government and affirmation of national unity. Added to this in Mozambique is the phobia about a fifth column and sabotage, which is expressed in the repeated calls for "vigilance" extending even to the country's motto⁴ and which explains the hostility of the international environment and the youth of the revolution.

Since it came to power the FRELIMO has opened a number of "reeducation camps" for three categories of persons: its political adversaries, members of the PIDE [Portuguese Political Police] or nationalist parties that revolted against it; the innumerable prostitutes who enlivened the hot streets of Maputo for South African tourists and whose number had been increased by the presence of a colonial army; finally, people who were rounded up in the poor sections of the cities, a number of "Jo and Pitas", marginal or unemployed, often drug addicts in this country the marijuana was among the best in Africa. Installed in the various camps according to the category of their origin, they joined there the political adversaries eliminated during the armed struggle who, there as elsewhere, serve as models: "new notables", excluded by the 11th FRELIMO Congress in July 1968, leaders of the assassination of Eduardo Mondlane in 1969⁵. Eight camps of this type are known, most of them in the provinces of Nord, Niassa and Nampula, but the number of "reeducated" is not known; the question as to what brought them there is judged to be "of little interest⁶."

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

At the present time the Party's distrust is directed chiefly against the leaders and cadres who intermediate between the Party and the state apparatus, at the province and district level. It is difficult to measure the magnitude of a phenomenon that is perceived only by way of sanction cases reported by the press, or not easily verifiable denunciations of "fascism" or "incompetence" by some administrator. Two types of offenses are in fact vigorously sanctioned among civil servants: thievery, misappropriation or corruption are the most serious; "immoral" sexual conduct, such as maintaining a mistress, violating or abusing a woman, having a baby without being married, is the second. Money and sex, considered to be the main roots of abuse of bureaucratic power, were the major obstacles to the building of a new administration founded on the revolutionary ethic of the "new man" that the FRELIMO wants to create out of the skin of colonized man, out of the bourgeois and the feudal.

The FRELIMO naturally came to be opposed to the religions that traditionally held the moral authority. Although the practice of cults is still authorized, no believer can become a member of the Party and all religious propaganda is forbidden. The battle against "obscurantism" is aimed first at eliminating a number of customs linked with animism: initiations, polygamy, beliefs and dealings in magic, etc. The confrontation with the organized religions, Catholicism and Islam, is more ideologic.

Although Mr Dos Santos, a minister today, had been received by Pope Paul VI in 1970, the FRELIMO sees in Catholics one of the rare forces capable of opposing its influence. The closing of the "Party structurization campaign" was a new opportunity for Mr Machel to condemn their activity in the country. The departure of hundreds of thousands of Portuguese, the nationalization of the schools and health services dealt severe blows to the Catholic Church.

Islam is resisting better, thanks to the presence of 1,000,000 to 2,000,000 Mozambicans of Indian origin. The government's temporizing policy is aimed at avoiding a strengthening of the cohesiveness of that community, all the more serious because the majority of its members work in capitalist sectors: trade, industry, liberal professions. These activities expose Mozambican Muslims to the constant suspicion of speculation and various kinds of traffic, on the part of the rest of the population as well as the Party. However, their enterprises remain quite modest, while the private commercial system is still indispensable in order to assure the country's provisioning. Moreover, concern for national unity prevents the FRELIMO from taking measures that would risk alienating the whole Muslim community.

At a higher level, the presence within the government and permanent political committee of persons of African origin as well as Indian or European who are known for their skills and their devotion to the political line bears witness to a similar concern.

Independent Mozambique inherited a disastrous economic situation. It can be summed up in two words: dependence and chaos.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The government gave itself the means for its agricultural policy by organizing the recovery of abandoned land within the framework of its first series of nationalizations of 24 July 1975. The measure, which gave birth to the state agricultural sector, was chiefly concerned with small exploitations of "colonates" and a few medium-sized plantations. The large exporting plantations were recovered by the state, one by one, in the years following.

Among the first affected were the immense properties of Jorge Jardim, which border--for nearly its entire length--the road from Beira to Chimoio, rotating the cultivation of sunflowers, cotton, sisal and corn. A key figure in colonial Mozambique, a representative type of "fat colonial", possessing interests in all of the country's economic sectors--especially in the CFP [French Petroleum Company] refineries in Maputo, which contributed to directing sanctions against Rhodesia--, Mr Jardim exercised an influence greater than that of the Portuguese governor. His offers to serve having been repulsed by the FRELIMO at the time of independence, he withdrew to the vicinity of Malawi, whence he is carrying on his fight by financing radio propaganda and commando incursions under cover of the Free Africa Movement.

State farms, implanted in the northern part of the country on heretofore unexploited land complete the disposition of the state sector in agriculture. Its expansion was brought about largely to the detriment of the capitalistic private sector, which has been practically absorbed. At the very most, scattered small islands continue to exist whose survival is tied in with special circumstances. Thus, around Gurue, in addition to the 50 or so tea plantations clustered in the heart of Emocha⁸, the privately-owned Zambezia Company has been permitted to operate. The decision is part of the concern for maintaining the presence of Mozambican tea on a very exclusive London market, where personal relations are basically what counts, as proven by stock that remains unsold because of the disappearance of the traditional commercial networks.

Priority for the "Popular Solutions"

The transition period is bringing about economic disorder. The old-style sector is the one chiefly affected; the large firms are contenting themselves with cutting down on their activity, in a prudent wait-and-see attitude toward the new government.

For the latter, the "production front" is becoming decisive, and it is making its choices: "The global strategy of our economic and social development is to take agriculture as a base and industry as an energizing and decisive factor." Agriculture, then, has priority.

Agricultural policy has given rise to the first serious confrontation since independence, with the FRELIMO. By excluding the minister of Agriculture after its fourth session in August 1978, the central committee was affirming its dedication to "popular solutions" over imported technologies; the priority granted to the cooperative and family sector over the state sector and the fundamental importance of the strides made by the "community villages" in the

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

development strategy. Indeed, Joachim de Carvalho thought he was specifically to blame for "not considering man the determining element in development and for dismissing man's part in production." And, in particular, "although he had been called to order on various occasions, he had persistently refused to apply the priority laid down by the managing organs with respect to the community villages."

Recourse to "popular solutions"--mass mobilization at harvest time or animal transport in preference to tractors--is largely dictated by necessity. Making a virtue of poverty, the FRELIMO, again referring to practices developed in the "liberated zones", presents it as the only way to appeal to the workers' creativity by putting "policy at the controls."

Facts and Figures

Population:	11,000,000 inhabitants 68 percent active in agriculture 12 percent active in mines and industry
Area:	801,590 square km.
Principal Imports:	Wheat, millet, rice, fish, meat, potatoes, peanuts, dairy products; textiles, oil, coal, medications, fertilizer, tractors, industrial equipment and raw materials
Principal Exports:	Cashews, sugar, cotton, sisal, tea, beans, wood, oil seeds, coal, shrimps, electric energy
State Budget (1978):	The equivalent of \$422,000,000

The Key Role of the Community Village

The influence of the state sector on Mozambican agriculture threatened to arouse some anger among the peasants, to be seen for example in the words of this old Mopeia farmer about the tractor fleets of Zambeze Province: "The fleets are polygamous, they have two wives--the state farms and the villages--but they prefer their first wife."

The priority now granted to family production marks a turning point in the agricultural policy followed up to now. The 1974-1975 production crisis brought about a catastrophic decline in export revenue and a serious food shortage in the country. Faced with that situation, only the state, thanks to its

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

mechanized methods and significant investments, was capable of re-establishing reproduction in a short time. However, that strengthening of the state sector did not solve the problem of reorganizing agriculture and might even take a direction opposite to the Party's directives, for which the support of the peasants is vital.

Family production, for which the FRELIMO encourages the forming of cooperatives, remains by far the most important. Since the disappearance of the cantineiros [canteen-keepers], such production, which provided a large part of Mozambican exports (cashews, copra, cotton) has slumped; no longer finding anyone to address themselves to in order to sell their surplus, the peasants are now content to provide for their own needs. The 3,000--at least--"trading posts" that would have to be established in order to start up again would, in the words of a Maputo government expert, represent an investment in qualified agents that Mozambique has not the means to finance at the present time. Moreover, despite its concern for increasing agricultural exports, the government does not want to relaunch trading. Its preferences lie in the direction of production cooperatives which, because of scattered housing, require a preliminary regrouping of the rural populations.

That double objective--development of cooperatives, regrouping of dwellings--should be attainable, thanks to the multiplication of "community villages." These are villages to be created in one piece, where the population has equipment for health and education and cultivates, in addition to family plots, collective fields organized into cooperatives. Begun in 1975, their importance was emphasized by the creation a year later of a "national community village commission", the only interministerial organization with the planning mission. Its chairman, Joao Batista Cosme, became minister of Public Works on the occasion of the 20 October 1978 reshuffle provoked by the appointment of Mario Machungo, a member of the permanent political committee, as head of Agriculture. The commission was given its own budget of 100,000 contos in 1978⁹.

One thousand community villages have already been built, bringing together over 1,000,000 peasants. Five hundred others are in gestation; collective production has begun there, the location of the village has sometimes been selected, but it has yet to be built. The northern provinces are the most advanced in the movement. Cabo-Delgado thus includes 75 percent of the country's villages. Then comes Gaza, that is, the Limpopo Valley, with 100 villages; then Nampula, also 100, but for a smaller population. Regrouping the populations has been accomplished without too much difficulty up to now, for the government has been able to take advantage of a number of circumstances. For example, the importance of the movement in Cabo-Delgado is explained by the former presence of the Party in the liberated zones. Moreover, the Portuguese had previously grouped the peasants into aldeamentos [villages], a kind of "strategic hamlet" meant to withdraw the population from the influence of the guerrillas and to supply a mass of manpower to the "colonates". Mozambican refugees in Malawi or in Tanzania are also assigned, on their return, to implantation areas to build a community village. Finally, natural disasters like the great Zambeze or Limpopo floods have encouraged the affected populations to regroup.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

So that it is rare for creation of "community villages" to follow the linear process outlined by the commission--collective production first, to introduce the idea and the practice among the peasants, then selecting a location, building the village and diversifying activities.

The villages are very different from one region to another, as much in their appearance--wood here, brick somewhere else, according to the type of material locally available--as in the "level of collective consciousness" of the inhabitants. Everywhere, however, there is that central important person who is the elementary general-purpose agent (APE), medical attendant, interpreter, "all-around" leader, who evokes the image of the lay mayor's secretary-teachers of the Third Republic and who is never separated from his bible, the "Manual of Hygiene and Elementary Care", given to him at the end of the provincial accelerated training course. Everywhere, too, teachers and instructors provide education for the young and literacy for the adults. In the Party's eyes the guarantees offered in matters of education and health, together with assurances of easier marketing of production, represent basic assets for rallying those peasants who are still isolated to the "community villages." The recently reaffirmed decision to encourage economic progress in the existing villages also depends on whether they, still in the minority, can in the next few years seduce the majority of a population that is pragmatic and not greatly enthused by new formulas.

One of the most difficult problems to be solved is still the connection to be established between "community villages" and state farms. The latter employ salaried workers and, quite often, seasonal workers. In Gurue, for example, the Emocha plantations regularly employ 8,000 workers and recruit 24,000 additional temporary workers between December and March, the busy part of the season. For now, the difficulty has been surmounted by resorting to volunteer work, as in Chokue, or by retaining, as in Gurue, the traditional and ridiculous salary by the day, which however had doubled since 1974, going from 21 to 42.50 escudos. The leaders affirm that the state sector and family production must be complementary and not competitive.

Heavy Industry in the Eighties?

There is complete agreement, on the other hand, on basing industrial development on planning. A Planning Commission and national directorates by means of branches have been created for that purpose. But the inadequacy of statistical apparatus does not yet allow for working out a middle- or long-term plan, and FRELIMO leaders have had to be content with establishing an "investment program" for the two years 1978-1979. These priority objectives reflect the current difficulties:

To improve the productivity of businesses, most of which are operating at just 50 percent of their production capacity.

To improve transportation, the condition of which constitutes a heavy handicap for supply and domestic trade; 45 percent of the program's resources are devoted to railroad and road systems and purchasing equipment.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Growth of Agricultural Production
(In Tons)

	Secteur d'Etat 1		Secteur coopératif 2		Production familiale 3		Secteur privé capitaliste 4		TOTAL	
	1973/74	1974/75	1975/76	1976/77	1977/78	1978/79	1979/80	1980/81	1981/82	1982/83
RIZ 5.....	480	12 440	41 200	100	340	3 200	3 600	2 800	4 000	4 000
MAIS et MIL 6.....	2 800	10 000	29 000	200	600	2 600	23 000	18 000	43 300	43 300
PATATES 7.....	7 000	18 000	21 800	300	1 300	1 900	300	300	500	500
COTON 8.....	230	3 700	11 300	100	500	2 400	22 800	29 800	67 000	67 000
COPRA 9.....			12 800						27 200	
THE 10.....		12 600	12 800							

Source : Noticias, numéro spécial du trentième anniversaire de l'indépendance, 25 juin 1978.

Key:

1. State Sector
2. Cooperative Sector
3. Family Production
4. Capitalistic Private sector
5. Rice
6. Corn and Millet
7. Potatoes
8. Cotton
9. Copra
10. Tea
11. Source: NOTICIAS, special third anniversary of independence issue, 25 June 1978.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

To develop fishing and mining exploration

Mozambican industry is still dominated largely by consumable goods industries: textiles, apparel, food. A private sector still exists in these branches when the owners did not abandon their firms at the time of independence. In cases where the reverse was true, the state took control of them by means of the "administrative commissions." After the refineries, the Moatize coal mines, electricity distribution and part of the steel industry, nationalization affected the banking sector, which was reorganized early in 1978. The Bank of Mozambique is the state's issuing institution and investment instrument; the People's Development Bank is the credit organization, the partner of business firms and cooperatives. Negotiations on indemnification are in progress with Portugal, and a privately-owned South African bank, the Standard Totta, is still in existence.

The Maputo leaders intend to endow the country with heavy industry during the eighties, a plan requiring preliminary developing of subsoil resources. It is in the prospecting phase and this is being conducted by Mozambican, East German and Romanian technicians, who are using advanced technology calling upon the satellite and the computer. For now there is no allusion to problems of investment and transfer of technology, which would probably put to the question again the principle of "counting on their own forces" by virtue of which Mozambique has heretofore refused to resort to foreign credit.

Industry is still largely dependent upon South African economic aid, for procurement as much as for outlets. The Maputo government paid the high price¹⁰ of its political choices by closing the border with Rhodesia, causing the half sleep of the port of Beira and the railroad connecting it with Salisbury. On the other hand, the government showed a realistic sense of compromise--from which, definitely, there is no longer any escape for revolutionary governments--in maintaining its trade with South Africa. One of the objectives of industrial development is nonetheless to break the Mozambican economy of this dependence with the help of developing resources not yet exploited: Cabora-Bassa electric energy, iron, copper and gold, which lie hidden in the subsoil of the Cabo-Delgado, Tete and Manica Provinces. The recent free trade agreement concluded with Tanzania was written in anticipation of its removal.

Another, more political objective: the appearance of a large proletariat should strengthen the dynamism of a revolution directed by the worker-peasant coalition party, whereas laborers represent only 12 percent of the active population (see box, page 7). In this country where laborers' organizations were practically nonexistent, the class consciousness of the laborers is still almost nil; factory work still represents an extra temporary activity by a family member who will then return to traditional agricultural work. There is considerable absenteeism. Although it is trying, through a form of self-management, to bring about a change of attitude, the FRELIMO does not yet seem able to succeed, if not with skilled workers, at least with shop foremen or overseers whose responsibilities have been increased by the revolution and for whom the factory has long been the principal workplace.

Firms are administered today by a management council including three authorities: 1) the technical directorate, appointed by the owner privately, an

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

"administrative commission" or directorate appointed by the state publicly; 2) representatives of the "production councils" which include all shop laborers; 3) the leaders of the political structure, "energizing groups" until last November, Party cells since then. Direct emanations from shops and production councils occupy an essential place within this triangular disposition. Responsible at first for outwitting economic sabotage and today for watching over increased productivity, they have become sufficiently important in certain firms to impose their forms of labor organization on a reluctant management. Without playing the role of labor unions, which do not exist in Mozambique, they represent a rough outline of workers' self-management.

Finally, economic progress is coming by means of literacy. The middle-term objective is to assure the whole population fourth grade level, that is the equivalent of a full primary education.

The Challenges of the Outside World

At the heart of southern Africa, bordering the Indian Ocean, Mozambique would like to be part of the socialist community. But although with the nonaligned countries it defends the anti-imperialistic nature of the organization, the consciousness of its originality and concern for its independence remain primordial. Joachim Chissano, minister of Foreign Affairs, clearly outlined the principles of this policy: "It is up to us Africans to preserve our dignity, our personality. It is natural for any country that helps another, no matter in what area, to be tempted to influence it, to reproduce there its own economic and political model. For that reason, at the last FRELIMO congress, we invited progressive friends from the entire world, from social democrats to Soviet and Chinese Communists. We told them we looked upon them as our brothers, but that we had our own pattern. There is no question of our adopting any line whatsoever. That is our point of view. If there are regimes that have a vocation for subjugation, to conduct themselves like valets of France or the Soviet Union of China or anyone, that is their affair and their responsibility¹¹." For his first official trip abroad, Samora Machel went to China, North Korea, Outer Mongolia and Hungary.

Obliged for economic reasons to carry on its trade with South Africa, Mozambique declares itself open to any form of foreign aid on condition that such assistance not be furnished on the basis of any political condition. But, although the socialist countries, the Scandinavian countries, Portugal or Italy maintain fruitful relations with Mozambique, the aid remains minimal. While Zambia has just been granted \$1,000,000 in credits by the Western countries, Mozambique has not yet seen all of the \$100,000,000 indemnity pledged by the UN to compensate for the losses springing from application of the sanctions against Rhodesia.

The crucial question, the subject of deep-seated debate--constant debate--among the Party's cadres and the Maputo intellectuals is still the "division in the socialist camp." Its geographic situation not making Mozambique an essential stake in the confrontation between the two powers, the leaders have until now been able to defer making any choice between China and the USSR

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

and hold onto the official position: to deplore divisiveness, affirm the refusal of models, abstain from publicly criticizing one or the other ally. How many times will the FRELIMO be able to avoid taking a stand and maintain good relations with both countries? The question is all the more delicate to settle because it brings the seeds of divisiveness in the leading class, where the visit of a Bulgarian leader or a new reference to Mao Tse-tung in a speech by the president are passionately commented upon.

Even though realism urges us to think that the position of the USSR is stronger today, the political evolution in Rhodesia will be a basic factor. A really independent African government in Salisbury would favor formation, around Tanzania, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, of a progressive pole in southern Africa, which because of its economic influence would be permitted relative freedom of action with respect to foreign powers. On the other hand, prolonging the Rhodesian conflict may drive each camp to seek outside support and allies who will then have something to say.

Deprived of wealth, having chosen the Marxism-Leninism road at a time when they are hastening everywhere to proclaim its bankruptcy, Mozambique might serve as an example for other states born, like herself, out of an armed struggle. Paradoxically, that poverty constitutes an asset for this country which, like Tanzania, can work out its future without giving too much weight to the contradictory advice of "friends" who are generally more interested in subsoil wealth than the people's well-being.

FOOTNOTES

1. Report of the permanent political committee at the fourth session of the FRELIMO central committee, August 1978.
2. Oscar Monteiro, secretary to the Party organization, minister of State, in "The Party in the State", Maputo, 1978.
3. Economy, Information, Foreign Affairs, Administration.
4. "Unity, Labor, Vigilance."
5. First president of the FRELIMO.
6. According to testimony gathered by Amnesty International, there were about 20 camps and 100,000 "reeducated."
7. EMOCHA: a Mozambican tea company.
8. One conto is worth 1,000 escudos (1 escudo is equal to approximately 13.5 centimes of our francs).

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

9. The UN has estimated the indemnity to be paid to Mozambique at \$100,000,000. The French share has still not been paid.

10. AFRIQUE-ASIE, 18 September 1978.

COPYRIGHT: Christophe Batsch and LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE

8946

CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SENEGAL

BRIEFS

PDS NONPARTICIPATION IN ELECTIONS--PDS [Senegalese Democratic Party] has decided to refuse to participate in the municipal elections scheduled for 25 February in Kebemer (150 kms northeast of Dakar) so long as the election code fails to guarantee the honesty of the election lists and the secret nature of the ballot. The prior elections in this city (in November 1976), won by the Socialist Party, have been annulled by the Supreme Court, following a complaint of fraud. PDS Secretary General Abdoulaye Wade was a candidate in that locality. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 12 Jan 79 p 74] 8339

EEC CHAIRMAN'S VISIT--EEC Chairman Roy Jenkins, who has just begun a tour of West Africa (Senegal, Mali, and Ghana), was received on 8 January by President Leopold Sedar Senghor and Senegalese Prime Minister Abdou Diouf. LE SOLEIL recalls on this occasion the 17 years of cooperation between the EEC and Senegal. Thus under the first EDF [European Development Fund], Senegal received 10,832 million francs, that is to say, 15.98 percent of the total funds paid. The resources of this first EDF were all used to finance projects of the countries associated with the EEC, by subsidy. Under the second EDF Senegal received 15,954 million (23.54 percent of the EDF). Under the third EDF, it received 17,268 million (25.48 percent). Under the fourth EDF it received 16,641 million (24.56 percent). In another connection, the EEC provided Senegal with 6,069 million and the BEI [European Investment Bank] provided it with 1 billion CFA francs. Within the framework of the fourth EDF, STABEX [Export Receipts Stabilization System] came into effect, thanks to which Senegal received an advance payment of 5,315 million CFA francs because of the 1977/1978 seasonal drought. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 12 Jan 79 p 74] 8339

MINISTER'S STATEMENT ON SPECIAL FUNDS--During the Senegalese national assembly's 4 January session, an opposition deputy submitted an oral question on a very controversial subject in Senegal: the existence of an account designated as "KK" created in 1962 by the state in the BNDS [Senegal National Development Bank] and destined, originally, to make up for the deficiency of the banking system in providing assistance for the agricultural sector. Minister of State for Finance and Economic Affairs Ousmane Seck has clarified the role and the operation of this account which, after several years, has advanced funds for budgetary operations not provided for by the Finance Law, to be paid for under later budgetary regularization. In 1970-1972, this account was used to support small and medium enterprises under the policy of encouraging

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Senegalese businessmen. Finally, the account is used to help to establish doctors, lawyers, etc. With regard to the amount of the sums distributed, Ousmane Seck said that on 30 September 1976, the account showed a debit of 7 billion and a credit of 6 billion and that since July 1976, on orders of the prime minister, the account has been closed because it could no longer cope with constantly increasing needs. However, the deputy responsible for the oral question, brought up the difficulties he had experienced in obtaining access to sources. He maintained that officials, or politicians could have been beneficiaries and that remittances had been made to some. In response, Ousmane Seck admitted that he had limited himself to citing the principal beneficiaries granted loans for small equipment. With regard to reimbursement, he indicated that a commission had been set up to check on the beneficiaries who had not paid their debts. Those who do not pay will be prosecuted as the law provides. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS 12 Jan 79 p 75] 8339

AGRICULTURAL GRANTS--In response to an oral question raised in the national assembly, Rural Development Minister Djibril Sene said that the total subsidy provided by the state for the 1978-1979 season amounts to 5.7 billion francs. In 1975, the state subsidized the consumption of fertilizer at a cost of 5 billion francs and provided 1.8 billion for agricultural materiel. But agriculture at that time had to recover from a serious drought. This year, the excellent crop prospects will not reduce public aid. Farmers have been granted a 40 percent cancellation of debts. It should also be recalled that investments in agriculture for 1979 total 20 billion francs. "While we have had delays in the past," Minister Djibril Sene explained, the situation has undergone a favorable change (...) It is important to note that the interministerial council last August extended debt limits on big crops (millet, rice, paddy, etc) for the last 3 years." He added: "Not only do we offer the farmers the possibility of choosing, but furthermore, the 2 percent preferential rate set by the BNDS has been reduced to 1 percent to encourage the equipment of the rural area. The cost of urea, an important factor in the yield of cereals, has also been reduced from 35 to 25 francs. The rural development minister said, finally, that the elements of the agricultural program will be in place by mid-May. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 12 Jan 79 p 75] 8339

RAINS CAUSING STORAGE PROBLEMS--Both in the Kaolack and in the Niore area, the latest rains have jeopardized the millet and peanut harvests. In Sine-Saloum, in some places up to 30 or 40 percent of the peanut seed or stalks have been affected by mildew. The CDD [Department Development Committee] has received 100 million francs to launch an effective marketing campaign. Near Kaolack the good millet and peanut production is likely to be spoiled if measures are not taken to store the surplus properly. Technicians are particularly concerned about reconstituting the "seed capital" which is also threatened by the excessive humidity. According to a regional ONCAD [National Office of Cooperation and Assistance] official, the production of edible

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

peanuts in the Sine-Saloum region amounts to 108,500 tons and the
tonnage purchased amounts to 11.3 million francs. [Text] [Paris
MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 12 Jan 79 p 75] 8338

CSO: 4400

END

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY